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INTIMATIONS OF LIFE:
EXTRACORPOREALITY AND THE LAW
George P. Smith, II*
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent qurvey entitl d, "Fecundity and ne-;Tiit; in th
United States: 1965-82," undertaken by the National Center for
Health Statistics, revealed that while infertility has remained fairly
constant in recent years among married couples, overall a trend
was detected among the young marrieds that found an eleven per-
cent rate of infertility in 1982 for wives between the ages of twenty
to twenty-four years; this compared with a previous rate of four
percent for the same age group in 1965.1 The study also predict-
ably found that problems of fecundity increased with age.2 Thus,
for married women between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four
who are childless, forty-eight percent were found to have encoun-
tered difficulties not only in conceiving but in carrying a fetus to
term.3 Twenty-one percent of couples aged twenty-five to thirty-
four encountered difficulties.
In early November, 1985, the National Committee for Adop-
tion reported that even though past government surveys revealed
that some two million married couples had expressed a desire to
adopt children, largely because of infertility, the United States
records only from 142,000 to 160,000 adoptions each year.5 The
Committee also stated that since three-fifths of these adoptions in-
volve either step-parents or other relatives assuming legal responsi-
bility for a child already in a family, only approximately fifty thou-
* B.C., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M. Columbia University. Professor of Law, The
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5. Rich, Demand for Adoptions Outnumbers the Babies, Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1985, at
A19, col. 1.
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sand babies remain in the market to satisfy the desires of the two
million couples who wish to adopt.
6
Economics of the critical baby shortage7 point dramatically to
the need for society to actively pursue means designed to increase
the opportunities for married couples to have children. One of
these is through in vitro fertilization.8 If procreation continues to
remain at the very center of a marital relationship and, indeed,
family the essence of a society that retains its vitality, 9 new and
even controversial endeavors are necessary in order to assure this
sort of marital fulfillment and societal success and, thus,
perpetuation. 10
This article will study and evaluate the efforts of the state and
the federal government to approach the problem of procreational
autonomy and to resolve the perimeters of its recognition and ap-
plication. In order to posit a framework for principled decision
making, an analysis of the Australian and British efforts to deal
with this problem, respectively, through their Waller and Warnock
Commissions, will be undertaken together with a consideration of
the famous case of Melbourne's "orphan" Rios embryos where, for
the very first time, the issue of excess fertilized embryos was
presented.
The thesis to be postulated here is simple: namely, work with
human in vitro fertilization must, under appropriate safeguards,
continue. Obviously, a critical analysis-but by no means an exege-
sis-of the central ethical and constitutional issues involved here
must precede this.
6. Id.
7. Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323
(1978).
8. See G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 104, 109-11, 119, (1981).
9. See Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 263
(1984).
10. See Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surro-
gate Mothers, 5 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 639 (1983); Smith, The Perils and Peregrinations of
Surrogate Mothers, 1 INT'L J. MED. & L. 325 (1982). See generally, The New Origins of Life:





With the extracorporeal birth of Louise Brown in July, 1978,
engendered outside her mother's body by the process of in vitro
fertilization or IVF, an enormous medical achievement was re-
corded." The world's first test-tube baby had been achieved and
validated scientifically. 2 In addition to this well known process of
artificial conception, artificial insemination, embryo transfer, par-
thenogenesis, and surrogate motherhood should all be considered
properly as within the ambit of the new reproductive technology' 3
and heirs to many of the concerns expressed over in vitro fertiliza-
tion as a process. 4
It has been calculated that, world wide, as of January, 1984,
well over two hundred babies were born as a consequence of in
vitro fertilization and embryo transfer.15 In the United States
alone, the American Fertility Society has reported that at least 125
clinics are operating presently or soon will operate which adminis-
ter and supervise the in vitro process.' 6
The Society is currently attempting to develop certification
systems for these centers, due to rising concern that unethical clin-
ics as well as doctors and lawyers may take advantage of childless
couples.17 Regardless of whether this new reproductive technology
is condemned as unnatural and risky,"8 violative of the personhood
of the embryo, 19 or recognized simply as a complex "moral mo-
rass,"20 it is rather obvious it will continue to be utilized as a
means, albeit exceptional, to combat infertility.2 ' The question,
11. All About That Baby, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 66.
12. Steptoe & Edwards, Birth After the Reimplantation of a Human Embryo, THE
LANCET, 366 (1978); The First Test-Tube Baby, TIME MAG., July 31, 1978 at 58.
13. See P. SINGER & D. WELLS, THE REPRODUcTIvE REVOLUTION: NEW WAYS OF MAKING
BABIES (1984 rev. ed.).
14. See id.
15. Abramowitz, A Stalemate on Test-Tube Baby Research, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
5 (Feb. 1984).
16. Otten, Fertility Group Issues Ethical Guidelines On the Use of Artificial Birth
Methods Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1986 at p. 10.
17. Id. The society noted that the rapid development in reproductive technology has
allowed for little consideration of the myriad of legal, ethical and medical implications.
18. Tiefel, Human In Vitro Fertilization, 247 J.A.M.A. 3235 (June 18, 1982).
19. Editorial, In Vitro Fertilization, 9 J. MED. ETHICS 187-88 (1983).
20. Frank, Moral Morass; Fetuses' Legal Status Touch, 71 A.B.A.J. 32 (Nov. 1985).
21. The use of this technology-and particularly the IVF process-is very expensive,
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then, is what safeguards must be structured in order to allow prin-
cipled decision-making here? More specifically, what degree of le-
gal protection should be afforded the extracorporeal embryo? Ob-
viously, it need not be considered a person in order to receive legal
protections.
22
When an in vitro fertilization allows for all the fertilized eggs
to be replaced (through the process of embryo replacement) in the
uterus of the original ovum donor, then the zone of protection
question arises only for the actual embryo for a short time, specifi-
cally while it is in vitro.2 3 The central concern is for the embryo's
safety from foreign organisms that might enter its controlled medi-
cal-scientific area due to carelessness on the part of a technician
and threaten the normality of its subsequent development. In
those cases where the embryos are not replaced, but frozen for fu-
ture implantation or used for non-therapeutic or basic research ef-
forts, the issue of the extent of legal protection is of considerable
importance.24 In addition to the previously noted concern for the
embryo's safety, here an extended cryopreservative process
presents an additional factor of the embryo's "consent" to be used
for non-therapeutic or genetic research efforts; if, that is, the fro-
zen embryos are regarded as having a type of ethical or moral
"rights." Of further concern is the consent of the sperm and ovum
donors to having their gametes used at a later date for a purpose
other than implantation. It has been suggested that this latter is-
sue could be resolved by allowing embryos to be frozen only when
the informed consent of both gamete donors (e.g., the sperm and
the egg donors) had been obtained and only with the specific stipu-
lation they be used in a subsequent fertility cycle if an initial preg-
nancy is not obtained. 5
with the range running from $4,000.00 to $7,000.00 for each attempt to transfer an embryo
or implant it once fertilized. An all time high figure of $12,000.00 has even been recorded.
Since normally at least three attempts will be necessary before a successful pregnancy is
charted, the total costs can run on an average to $36,000.00 or even more. Supra note 15, at
8.
22. Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New
Laws, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 50, 52 (Oct. 1984).
23. Id. at 51.
24. Id. See infra note 87 and the case of Del Zio v. Manhattan's Columbia Presbyte-
rian Medical Center, No. 74-3558 (S.D.N.Y., April 12, 1978).
25. Id. See also, Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff, Special Report, Frozen Embryos:
Policy Issues, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1584 (June 13, 1985); Auigley & Andres, Human In
398 [Vol. 21:395
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Similarly, when a contemplated use of the embryo exceeds or
deviates from the initial purpose of achieving a pregnancy (i.e., for
research or genetic engineering purposes), should the informed
consent of the gametes donors be required? 2 In the event only one
of them were living, would not he or she retain the decision making
authority as to the intended use?27 Where both gametes donors
have died, should the embryo be destroyed? 28 Before studying
what st at ad fVUeral government's axe actually undertaking to
"regulate" the use of in vitro fertilization procedures and thereby
protect the embryos used therein, it is wise to consider at this
juncture the major ethical and moral dimensions of this issue.
III. THE ETHICAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS
The ethical morality of in vitro fertilization is a deep and com-
plex issue-certainly far beyond the basic purpose of this article. It
is important for a complete understanding of the issues of the
adoption and use of in vitro fertilization, however, to synthesize
the major dimensions of this issue. These in turn shape constitu-
tional posture regarding both the propriety and the regulation of
certain new technological methods for creating human life. Obvi-
ously, no definitive conclusions can be proffered, particularly since
the ongoing debate involves deeply held personal resolutions tied
to highly personal beliefs and emotions.
A threshhold ethical-moral issue is whether in vitro fertiliza-
tion is a "natural" means of human reproduction or whether its
separation of sex from procreation means it is inherently wrong.29
Does the conception of babies under laboratory conditions degrade
parenthood and in turn negate the process of humanity,30 or does
Vitro Fertilization and the Law, 42 FERTIL. & STERIL. 348 (1984).
26. See generally supra note 25.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Tiefel, Human In Vitro Fertilization: A Conservative View, 247 J.A.M.A. 3235
(June 1982); Studdard, The Morality of In Vitro Fertilization, 5 HUM. LIFE REv. 41 (1979);
TEST-TUBE BABIES (W. Walter & P. Singer eds. 1982).
30. P. RAMSEY, THE ETHICS OF FETAL RESEARCH (1975); P. RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN:
THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 104-60 (1970); Kass, Making Babies-The New Biology
and the Old Morality, 26 PUB. INTEREST 32 (Winter 1972).
But see, Fletcher, New Beginnings in Life: A Theologian's Response, in THE GENETICS
AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 78, 87 (M. Hamilton ed. 1972) where the author states his position
that in vitro fertilization and embryo transfers are not only acceptable but preferable forms
3991985/861
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it merely provide a solution to the tragic problem of infertility that
afflicts such a growing number of married couples? 31 Is there an
absolute vested right, as a consequence of the marital relationship,
to have a child at any and all costs?
A second concern is whether IVF may be morally wrong be-
cause it involves the risk of harm to an individual who is yet un-
born.2 The anticipated harm (although not scientifically docu-
mented at this time) could be in the nature of a specific physical
injury or abnormality resulting from the IVF procedure, or from
the subsequent genetic mother's or birth mother's womb (in the
case of a surrogate), or even from a psychological harm that might
result to the child born of the total process.3
Another ethical-moral concern is at what point in time should
the product of conception gain protectable rights. If the fetus is
ethically regarded as a human being at the moment of its concep-
tion (when the egg and sperm unite), it is due all human rights and
may, accordingly, claim them through a duly appointed guardian. 4
If, contrariwise, a blastocyst is not recognized as a person and not
entitled to a conferral of "human rights" upon it, it has been sug-
gested that it is a potential or "nascent" human being. Therefore,
it should be given the right, as are all human subjects of experi-
mentation, to exercise an informed consent (given here, obviously,
by a proxy through its parents or a court appointed guardian)
before being subjected to fetal research and experimentation.3 5
Query: would the average ordinary reasonable person ever consent
to a scientific or medical intervention which might very well bring
great pain and ultimate extinction? Using its parens patriae pow-
of procreation simply because they are much more controlled and deliberative than normal
acts of coitus.
31. See supra notes 1-6.
32. Tiefel, supra note 29. See also, M. TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 87-285
(1983).
33. Tiefel, supra note 29.
34. See R. MCCORMICK, How BRAVE A NEW WORLD?, Chs. 1, 16 (1981); MAKING BABIES:
THE TEST TUBE AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS (A. Nichols, T. Hogan eds. 1984). See also, Robert-
son, Extracorporeal Embryos and the Abortion Debate, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y.
53 (1986).
35. Kass, Ethical Issues in Human In Vitro Fertilization, Embryo Culture and Re-
search and Embryo Transfer, ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, Dept. of Health, Education and
Welfare, Appendix: H.E.W. Support of Research Involving Human In Vitro Fertilization
and Embryo Transfer § 2 at 6 (1979). See also, McCormick, supra note 34.
[Vol. 21:395
INTIMATIONS OF LIFE
ers, a state might well refuse to allow one of its citizens to partici-
pate in such a project. Thus, if the embryo is regarded as a poten-
tial person or mini-citizen, it could be argued that it could never be
used or participate in such a non-therapeutic undertaking. Still,
another contrary view could be that the ethical and human rights
of a blastocyst only accrue to it when it is implanted. 6
This accrued rights issue becomes paramount to the mtttpr of
the (possible or potential) destruction of fertilized eggs. One of the
major ethical-moral objections to the whole process in in vitro fer-
tilization is the "unavoidable" loss through destruction of those
eggs determined not to be the "best" one for implantation. If ex-
cess or spare embryos may not ethically be viewed as sources for
genetic research and experimentation, they are at once discarded. 7
The resolution of this ethical conundrum is relatively simple:
namely, instead of inducing superovulation which in turn allows
for the recovery of a number of eggs and their subsequent in vitro
fertilization, efforts could (and should) be undertaken to follow the
natural cycle which results in the retrieval of one egg at a time for
the process of fertilization and the subsequent embryo transfer to
the genetic mother.38
A final ethical objection of some to the IVF process is that it
may lead to a "slippery slope." 9 Stated otherwise, in vitro fertili-
zation together with embryo transfer may lead to the unimpeded
use of surrogate mothers as substitutes for the genetic mother; the
dissolution of the family unit by single, unmarried women (or even
lesbians) who no longer see any reason to marry or have sexual
relations with a man, or even promote the development of artificial
wombs (ectogenesis) whereby women no longer need to have "con-
tact" with their children until after they are, so to speak, born.40
It has been suggested that:
36. T. CARNEY, INSTANT EVOLUTION, 20 (1980).
37. Kass, supra note 35, Appendix § 2 at 9.
38. See Taymor, Current Status of In Vitro Fertilization and Reimplantation, GE-
NETICS AND THE LAW II 345, 347 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1980).
39. Morgan, The Created Individual: Are Basic Notions of Humanity Threatened? in
TEST TU3E BABIES, supra note 29 at 88. Walters, Cloning, Ectogenesis, and Hybrids:
Things to Come? Id. at 10.
40. Id. See also, Scott, Legal Implications and Law Making in Bioethics and Experi-
mental Medicine, 1 J. CONTEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y. 47, 59-60 (1985).
1985/861
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Even if in vitro fertilization would result in the birth of a child, the
procedure arguably is not medically justified, in that it is not therapeutic
even to the potential parents. Although it may allow an infertile couple
to have a child, it has not cured the infertility. Yet, alternatively, if our
society sanctions therapeutic abortion why not therapeutic conception.
4 1
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF REGULATION
The extent to which states may validly endeavor to regulate
IVF procedures and embryo transfers depends upon whether these
acts are viewed as fundamental rights. Thus, the threshhold ques-
tion is whether they are "rights" guaranteed implicitly by the Con-
stitution as part of the "right to marital privacy."'"
Various United States Supreme Court decisions seem to grant
"the right ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children,"
as among those liberties granted by the fourteenth amendment.4"
Based upon these cases, it could be argued that any state regula-
tion of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfers would be blatant
intrusion upon the fundamental right to marital privacy."' Accord-
ingly, "[I]f the decision to beget a child is a protected area of pri-
vacy, presumably the actual method of begetting also would be
protected. Thus, any statute affecting this delicate area would have
to serve a compelling state interest and must do so by the least
restrictive means.
' 45
A more conservative analysis of the Supreme Court decisions
in this area recognizes, at the threshhold, that the right to privacy
is not explicitly mentioned in the United States Constitution. No
right of sexual freedom is found within the gambit of procreative
rights recognized by the Supreme Court nor has the Court fash-
ioned a general right of personal privacy which is sufficiently
41. Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for Litigation,
35 Sw. L.J. 973, 983 (1982).
42. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 740 passim (2d ed. 1983).
43. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978). See also Carey v. Population Ser-
vices Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Prince v. Massachu-
setts 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).




broad-based to permit sex outside marriage.4 0
The Supreme Court first recognized a constitutionally pro-
tected zone of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut,47 and invali-
dated part of a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contra-
ceptives by married persons .4 The protection of this aspect of
procreative autonomy "was largely subsumed within a broad right
to marital privacy' 49 which "stressed the unity and independence
of the married couple and forbade undue inquiry into conjugal
acts." 50 From this, however, it cannot be argued that there must
exist a co-ordinate fundamental right to reproduce, or to use artifi-
cal reproductive technology such as in vitro fertilization.51 As Mr.
Justice Goldberg made clear in his concurring opinion, Griswold,
"in no way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual
promiscuity or misconduct," and thus the constitutionality of Con-
necticut's statutes prohibiting adultery and fornication remained
beyond dispute.2
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,3 the High Court was confronted with
construing a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribu-
tion of contraceptives to unmarried persons. In holding that the
statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the court observed that "[I]f the right to privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."'5' Accordingly, the Eisenstadt court fleshed
46. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Pri-
vacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MicH. L. REV. 463, 538 (1983).
47. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. The Court observed that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penum-
bras, formed by emanations from the guarantees that help give them life and substance." Id.
at 484 (citation omitted). Thus, it was those "[viarious guarantees [which] created the zones
of privacy." Id.
49. Comment, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1850, 1867 (1981). See also, Smith Genetics, Eugenics and Family Planning: Exploring
the Yin and the Yang, 8 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 4 (1984).
50. Comment, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1156, 1183 (1980).
51. Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction: Legal Problems Presented by the
Test-Tube Baby, 28 EMORY L. J. 1045, 1058 (1979).
52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965).
53. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
54. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
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out the procreative skeleton of Griswold which initially appeared
confined to the so-called "sacred" precincts of the matrimonial
bedroom chambers.56 This decision, however, did no more than re-
fine a qualified right to procreative autonomy blurred by the Gris-
wold Court's emphasis on the marital relation.66
In Roe v. Wade,57 the Court addressed squarely an integral
part of the individual's right to procreative autonomy when an un-
married woman in a class action challenged the constitutionality of
the Texas criminal abortion laws. The Court articulated a new
source of privacy derived from the fourteenth amendment's stan-
dard of personal liberty and inherent restrictions upon state action
and held this right was sufficiently broad to embrace a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.58 The Court
went further to state, however, that it was not recognizing "an un-
limited right to do with one's body as one pleases."5'
The final pertinent case of interest in this area is Carey v.
55. Id. at 453.
56. "It has been suggested that the Court's opinion was lacking in candor, for it stated
in broad dictum a major extension of the 'privacy right' which could have justified its deci-
sion, while purporting to rest on a strained conclusion that the statute involved failed even
the minimal rationality test." Supra note 50 at 1184 (footnotes omitted).
Under an expansive liberal interpretation, Eisenstadt has been held to extend the right
of privacy to all sexual activities of whatever nature. See Wilkinson and White, Constitu-
tional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 589 (1977).
57. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. Id. at 153. This right, however, was not absolute and the degree of involvement
allowed would be continuant on the length of the pregnancy. "[P]rior to approximately the
end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." Id. at 164. After this
stage, the "State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation rea-
sonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health." Id. Finally, after
viability, the state may protect fetal life and "may go so far as to proscribe abortion during
that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at
163-64.
59. Id. at 154. In an opinion announced June 11, 1986, in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 54 U.S.L.W. 4618, the United States Supreme
Court held that the States-and here, Pennsylvania-were not free to deliberately intimi-
date women into continuing unwanted pregnancies. In acting to invalidate certain provisions
of Pennsylvania 1982 Abortion control Act, the Court rejected the State's argument that its
compelling interests in preserving life (of viable fetuses) was superior
and-thus-controlling over "constitutional privacy interests and concerns with maternal
health in an effort to deter a woman from making a decision that, with her physician is hers
to make" (Id. at 4621).
INTIMATIONS OF LIFE
Population Servs. Int'l.60 In Carey, the Supreme Court invalidated
a New York statute regulating sale and distribution of contracep-
tives to minors, and stated "at the very heart of [the] cluster of
constitutionally protected choices," recognized in the previous pri-
vacy cases, 61 was "the decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child. '6 2 Carey is particularly instructive on the question of the
unmarried woman's right to artificial insemination or in vitro fer-
t..iatio proceures as it examines the previous privacy cases and
delineates the extent of the individual's right to procreative
autonomy.
It has been suggested that since a woman has a right to termi-
nate her pregnancy and to use contraceptives, a posteriori, the
conduct required to bring about those procreative choices must
also be protected." The Court's opinion in Carey indicates, how-
ever, that this is simply not the case.
First, with regard to contraception and abortion, the Carey
Court made clear that it is "[the] individual's right to decide to
prevent conception or terminate pregnancy" that is protected. 4
Such unequivocal language, however, lends little or no support to
the argument that a concomitant right to conceive is also pro-
tected. Second, the Court emphasized that its decision did not en-
compass any constitutional questions raised by state statutes regu-
lating either sexual freedom or adult sexual relations. 5 This
reading of Carey is supported by a later decision of the Court that
stated if the "appellee's right to procreate means anything at all, it
must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the
[s]tate ... allows sexual relations legally to take place."' 6 Thus, the
60. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality opinion).
61. In addition to the privacy cases already analyzed in this article, the Court cited
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
62. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685.
63. Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call
for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARv. WOMEN'S L. J. 16, 27-28 (1981).
64. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 688, n.5. See generally, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 431 U.S. 49, 68 n.15
(1973) (implication that state fornication statutes do not violate the federal constitution).
But see State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977) (holding that fornication statute
involves by its very nature a personal choice and that it infringes upon the right of privacy).
66. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
1985/861
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lesson from the Court's decisions in Skinner, Griswold, Eisenstadt,
Roe, and Carey is plain: "procreative automony includes both the
right to remain fertile and the right to avoid conception," ' 7 but
currently guarantees absolutely nothing more.
A. State Action
Since the unmarried woman's decision to be artificially insemi-
nated or participate in an in vitro fertilization procedure does not
fall within the gambit of any recognized fundamental right, state
statutes limiting the procreative technology to married women only
"[may] be sustained under the less demanding test of rational-
ity. .. "68 Under this test, all that is required is that the distinc-
tion drawn be "rationally related" to a "constitutionally permissi-
ble" objective.6 9 In employing this rather relaxed standard, courts
must be sensitive "that the drawing of lines that create distinc-
tions is peculiarly a legislative task and an avoidable one."" °
Absent a suspect classification or the infringement of a funda-
mental right, the Supreme Court has recognized that legislation
"protecting legitimate family relationships" as well as both the reg-
ulation and protection of the family unit are "venerable state con-
cerns." 1 Statutes limiting the availability of artificial insemination
to married women and statutes that might (indeed, should) be
drafted to limit the use of IVF procedures to married women, fall
squarely within this classification.
As early as 1888, the Court recognized marriage as "the foun-
dation of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress." 7 Recently, it observed that "a
decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional family setting
must receive equivalent protection." 73 Thus, although certain as-
pects of an individual's right to procreative automony have cor-
rectly been divorced from the familial and marriage relationship,
67. Supra note 50, at 1185. See also Wilkinson & White, supra note 56 at 591-594
(1977).
68. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1976).
69. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
70. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
71. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
72. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
73. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
[Vol. 21:395
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the Court has also implicitly recognized that, whenever possible,
childrearing should take place within the traditional family unit.
7 4
An unmarried woman's decision to seek artificial insemination or
to participate in an IVF procedure goes directly against the tide of
these pronouncements.
V. THE STATE AND THE FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE POSITIONS
It is doubtful the legal status of an embryo can ever, with clar-
ity, be legislated nationally because society is not of a singular
mind nor is there a consensus of when "life" should be recognized
as being legally protectable. Juridical interpretation of this issue
has brought about national debate with the decision in Roe v.
Wade." Despite the lack of agreement here, for those children
born of an IVF procedure where either a donor ova or donor sperm
have been used, they should be recognized as children of the fam-
ily in which they were born. No issue of illegitimacy should be
raised nor should the donors be held to any level of financial sup-
port of the child or right of inheritance against the donors. Not
only are the best interests of the IVF child served in this way, but
more importantly, the strength of the family unit is guaranteed
and its stability assured."
In the aftermath of Roe v. Wade77 which, as observed, had the
effect of "legalizing" abortion under certain circumstances, some
twenty-five states enacted fetal research laws 78 designed primarily
74. See generally, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. See generally, Smith supra note 10; Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artifi-
cial Insemination and The Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1968).
77. Supra note 74.
78. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-434, 82-435 (1976);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 25956 (West 1984);l FLA. STAT ANN. § 390.001 (6) (West.
1986), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 81-32, 81-32.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-1-58.5-6 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.026 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1593
(1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112 612J (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1982); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
14.15 (Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.421-145.422 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(3) (1985); NEs. REV.
STAT. § 28-342, 28-346 (1985), N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1 to 24-9A-7 (1985); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-02.2-01 to -02 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3216 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 11-54-1, 11-54-2 (Supp. 1985); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1986); TENN.
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to control research on aborted fetuses. Several statutes extend
their protective coverage to research on embryos which could have
an effect on the initiation of programs utilizing IVF procedures.
The procedural safeguards which could be demanded for medical-
scientific work for IVF could be viewed as too cumbersome and
thus serve as a discouragement for such a program. 0 Some safe-
guards may affect the procedural uses of preserving excess embryos
and be regarded similarly as either bothersome or cumbersome.8 "
CODE ANN.. § 39-4-208 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (Allen Smith 1978); WYo. STAT. §
35-6-115 (1977).
79. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-434, 82-435 (1976);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001 (6) West 1986);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 81-26, 81-32, 81-32.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-1-58.5-6 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-342, 28-346
(1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (1973)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3216 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208 (1982);
WYO. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977).
80. Examples are the California and Minnesota statutes:
... (a) It is unlawful for any person to use any aborted product of human con-
ception, other than fetal remains, for any type of scientific or laboratory research
or for any other kind of experimentation or study, except to protect or preserve
the life and health of the fetus. Fetal remains, as used in this section, means a
lifeless product of conception regardless of the duration of pregnancy. A fetus
shall not be deemed to be lifeless for the purposes of this section, unless there is
an absence of a discernible heartbeat.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956(a) (West. 1984).
The Minnesota statutes states that:
... Whoever uses or permits the use of a living human conceptus for any type of
scientific, laboratory research or other experimentation except to protect the life
or health of the conceptus, or except as herein provided, shall be guilty of a gross
misdemeanor.
2. The use of a living human conceptus for research or experimentation which
verifiable scientific evidence has shown to be harmless to the conceptus shall be
permitted.
3. Whoever buys or sells a living human conceptus or nonrenewable organ of the
body is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Nothing in this subdivision prohibits (1)
the buying and selling of a cell culture line or lines taken from a non-living human
conceptus; (2) payments for reasonable expenses associated with the removal,
storage, and transportation of a human organ, including payments made to or on
behalf of a living organ donor for actual expenses such as medical costs, lost in-
come, or travel expenses that are incurred as a direct result of a donation of the
nonrenewable organ; or
3. financial assistance payments provided under insurance and medicare reim-
bursement programs.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422.
81. Michigan statutes, for example, prohibit research on a live embryo if its life or
health may be jeopardized. § 333-2685 (1) provides that:
A person shall not use a live human embryo, fetus, or neonate for nontherapeutic
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Yet, in a number of these states, the very legality of in vitro fertili-
zation as a medical procedure to overcome infertility is in
question.2
Only Pennsylvania" and Illinois84 have statutes regarding in
vitro fertilization. Pennsylvania's law was enacted to monitor the
procedure and provides simply that anyone conducting IVF's is to
file quarterly reports with the state Department of Health, describ-
ing fully the processes involved with the undertaking.8 5 The Illinois
statute is criminal in nature but, interestingly, does not directly
prohibit the IVF procedures, instead making a physician who fer-
tilizes a woman's egg outside her body the custodian of that issue
for purposes of an 1977 Child Abuse Act.86 The statute addition-
ally grants custody to the physician, but does not make provisions
for the parents to ever regain custody.87 It fails to address the is-
research if, in the best judgment of the person conducting the research, based
upon the available knowledge or information at the approximate time of the re-
search, the research substantially jeopardizes the life or health of the embryo, fe-
tus, or neonate. Nontherapeutic research shall not in any case be performed on an
embryo or fetus known by the person conducting the research to be the subject of
a planned abortion being performed for any purpose other than to protect the life
of the mother.
(2) For purposes of subsection (1) the embryo or fetus shall be conclusively pre-
sumed not to be the subject of a planned abortion if the mother signed a written
statement at the time of the research, that she was not planning an abortion
(MCL § 333.2685) § 333.2686. Sections 2685 to 2691 shall not prohibit or regulate
diagnostic, assessment, or treatment procedures, the purpose of which is to deter-
mine the life or status or improve the health of the embryo, fetus, or neonate
involved or the mother involved. § 14.15 (2692) Sec. 2692. As used in sections 2685
to 2691, "nontherapeutic research" means scientific or laboratory research, or
other kind of experimentation or investigation not designed to improve the health
of the research subject MCL § 333.2696).
82. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies, 70
A.B.A.J. 50, 54-55 (Aug. 1984). Blumberg, Legal Issues on Nonsurgical Human Ovum
Transfer 251 J.A.M.A. 1178 (March 2, 1984); Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman,
Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo. L. J. 1295 (1979).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3213(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7) (1983-84).
85. Supra note 81.
86. Supra note 82.
87. The Illinois statute, cited supra at note 84, was challenged in a class action
brought by married couples and their physicians who wanted to use the IVF procedure. This
case was dismissed for lack of a case or controversy when the court accepted the state's
argument that the statute did not prohibit the procedure and that prosecution would not
ensue if the physician performed the procedure without willful endangerment or injury to
the embryo during the pre-emplantation period. Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D.
Ill. 1983).
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sues of either legitimacy or inheritance rights. Sadly, there are at
present no state statutes that propose to clarify the legal status of
IVF children."8
A. The Federal Position
Both as a response to Louise Brown's extracorporeal birth in
1978 and to a grant application for in vitro fertilization research,
the then Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now the
Department of Health and Human Services) and its Ethics Advi-
sory Board decided to study the complex ethical, legal, social and
scientific issues raised by the IVF process.8 9 Even though the final
report of the Department was ultimately "buried in the bureau-
cracy,"90 today, given the sometimes strident pro-life mood of a vo-
cal segment of society, there is pessimism that a strong positive
movement will occur at the federal regulatory level."' Yet, due
largely to the leadership of former Congressman (now Senator) Al-
bert Gore of Tennessee, hearings were conducted in August, 1984,
on the very issue of embryo transfers and the legal, ethical and
medical responses to such procedures.92 Although no firm or con-
clusive steps were taken as a consequence of these hearings, they
served to focus attention on the need for continuing dialogue in
The only other decision involving an in vitro fertilization procedure was an unpublished
case, Del Zio v. Manhattan's Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, No. 74-3558 (S.D.N.Y.,
April 12, 1978), which resulted in an award to the prospective parents of damages for emo-
tional distress caused by the willful destruction of an embryo produced by IVF. The Chief
of Obstetrics and Gynecology had removed the embryo from the incubator and destroyed it,
stating that the physician who had performed the laparoscopy and subsequent fertilization
in 1972 lacked the necessary skills and, moreover, the hospital's committee on experimenta-
tion had not yet approved IVF. See Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer:
Fertile Areas for Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 996-97 (1982).
88. Supra note 82.
89. ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILI-
ZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033 (1979).
90. Krause, Artificial Conception: Legal Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q. No. 3 185, 190
(1985). See also, Abramowitz, supra note 15.
91. This pessimistic, although realistic, view is tied to a perception that it would be far
better to hold in abeyance any strong movement at this time for fear of its possible linkage
with the right-to-life controversies and would thus give rise to the real possibility that it
would never be allowed to be evaluated in a calmer atmosphere. Abramowitz, supra note 15.
92. See Hearings On Human Embryo Transfer, Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Science and Technology, 98th




Because of a de facto moratorium set in 1975, no federally
funded research has been undertaken on in vitro fertilization. 3
Even though the 1979 Report of the Ethics Advisory Board of
HEW concluded that federal support of research on humans in or-
der to establish the safety and the effectiveness of IVF procedures
would be ethically permissible as long as certain conditions were
met,- the Report has never been accepted nor the moratorium en-
ded; there is no real likelihood such action will be taken soon. 5
It should be noted carefully that the involvement by the fed-
eral government and its Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices is presently structured by general regulations protecting
human subjects which apply to any IVF research, development, or
other related activities that might in the future be conducted by
the Department, or by the federal government outside the Depart-
ment.9 6 As to research projects that involve fetuses and/or preg-
nant women, the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department will be
required to review every such proposal for in vitro fertilization "as
to its acceptability from an ethical standpoint.
9 7
Subsequent specific protections have been provided fetuses
who are the subject of proposed experimentation and IVF re-
search.9 8 Although limited to research efforts funded in whole or in
part by the federal government,"9 these guidelines make a signifi-
cant distinction with regard to potential legal rights of unim-
planted embryos. 10 The distinction is apparent in the very defini-
tion of "fetus: the product of conception from the time of
implantation (as evidenced by any of the presumptive signs of
pregnancy, such as missed menses, or a medically acceptable preg-
93. Supra note 15.
94. Supra note 89 at 35,057. Among these conditions were that the blastocyst be sus-
tained no longer or beyond the implantation state and that IVF be used only by married
couples who had donated their sperm and ova. Abramowitz, supra note 15.
95. Supra note 15, at 6.
96. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-122, 46.301 (1985).
97. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d) (1985). See also 45 C.F.R. § 46.205 (1985).
98. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102-.206 (1985). In Vitro fertilization is defined as "any fertiliza-
tion of human ova which occurs outside of the body of a female, either through admixture of
donor sperm and ova or by other means." Section 46.203(g) (1983).
99. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1985).
100. Blumberg, supra note 82.
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nancy test) .... 0o
As a consequence of this structured definition, research under-
taken on fetuses in utero and ex utero is prohibited unless the
purpose of the activity is to either meet the particular health needs
of the at-risk fetus or there is minimal real or potential harm to
the fetus by the research and the purpose is to obtain biomedical
knowledge not otherwise obtainable.102 Research undertaken on
non-viable fetuses ex utero is prohibited unless either vital func-
tions will not be maintained artificially, experimental activities
that would terminate vital functions are not used, or the research
purpose is to obtain otherwise unobtainable significant biomedical
knowledge. 103 The obvious implication of these restrictions on em-
bryonic and fetal research is that the scientific pursuit of mankind
is significantly handicapped. Private research into the mysteries
and the opportunities of the new reproductive biology continues.
But, without a balanced regulatory scheme and sources for federal
research funding, the initiative and the momentum for scientific
advancement is curtailed.
VI. THE AUSTRALIAN AND THE BRITISH MOVEMENT TOWARD
STABILITY
A. The Australian Initiative
Australian national, ethical guidelines on in vitro fertilization
have been in place since 1982;104 structured by the National Health
and Medical Research Council. 105 Guideline Seven suggests an up-
per time limit (in the order of ten years) be placed upon the stor-
age of embryos which does not go beyond "the time of conven-
tional reproductive need or competence of the female donor." 106
Thus, applied to a woman's capability to conceive, it is obvious at
the death of a married woman who has left fertilized ovum in cry-
opreservation that her reproductive capability has ended and her
101. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(c) (1985).
102. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.208(a)-209(a) (1)-(2) (1985).
103. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.209(b) (1)-(3) (1985).
104. Scott, Legal Implications and Law Making in Bioethics and Experimental
Medicine, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y. 47, 58, 59, 64 (1985).
105. See Ethics in Medical Research Involving the Human Fetus and Human Fetal
Tissue (NAT'L. HEALTH & MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1983).
106. Id. Supplementary Note 7 at 36.
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embryos could be destroyed. The Council not only endorsed the
use of in vitro fertilization as an acceptable scientific procedure to
correct infertility among married couples,107 but also the use of do-
nor eggs in women to produce embryos, 08 and the use of artificial
insemination by anonymous male donors.10 9
Law reform activity in the field of artificial conception first
began in earnest with a study undertaken by the New South Wales
Law Reform Commission dealing with artificial insemination in
1982.110 A few weeks later, the Victorian government established a
Committee, subsequently designated the Waller Committee, in
honor of its Chairman, Professor Louis Waller. The Committee
was mandated to investigate the problems arising from in vitro fer-
tilization and donor gametes (or the male sperm and female eggs).
Soon to follow in similar research activities were the Queensland
Government and that of Western Australia.1"
The Waller Report On the Disposition of Embryos Produced
By in vitro Fertilization was released in mid-August, 1984, in Mel-
bourne, Australia, by the Attorney General of Victoria. The Com-
mittee concluded, among other points, that the disposition of
stored embryos is not to be determined by the hospital where they
are in fact stored" 2 and that such embryos are not to be regarded
as possessing legal rights or having rights to lay claim to inheri-
tance."' Also, in cases where "mischance or for any other reason,
an embryo is stored which cannot be transferred as planned, and
no agreed provision has been made at the time of storage ... the
embryos shall be removed from storage.' The Committee addi-
tionally held embryos could be frozen"15 and experimental research
107. Id. at 35, Guideline 2.
108. Id. at 35, 36, Guidelines 3, 4.
109. Id. at 36, Guideline 6. See also, Skene, Moral and Legal Issues in the New Bio-
technology, 59 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 379, 388-89 (July 1985).
110. Scott supra note 104, at 55-60; Lawson, Molloy, Jobson & Walley, The Life and
Strange Times of Elsa Rios, The [Australian) Bulletin 22, 25 (July 3, 1984).
111. Id. See also Skene, supra note 109, at 385-388. See generally, Law Report, In
Vitro Veritas? Institute Says Waller Committee's Recommendation Needs More Study, 58
LAW INSTITUTE J. 468 (1984).
112. Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization § 2.16
(1984).
113. Id. § 2.19.
114. Id. § 2.18.
115. Id. §§ 3.25-3.28.
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"shall be immediate and in an approved and current project in
which the embryo shall not be allowed to develop beyond the state
of implantation which is completed 14 days after fertilization."""
In cases where surplus embryos are produced in the laboratory
intentionally or unintentionally and exceed the number appropri-
ate for transfer to the uterus of the intended mother, 117 after short
term storage, 18 the Committee recommended that the decision
made by the couple whose sperm and ova have been used in the
formation of the embryo'1 9 should be given effect by a donation of
the stored embryos to other couples participating in the IVF pro-
gram, a donation of the embryos for research or experimentation
or their removal from storage.'
Another major issue before the Committee was whether em-
bryos possessed certain "rights" which might prevent them from
being the subject of continued research and experimentation in the
Victoria IVF program. 21 A majority of the Committee concluded
that while such research and experimentation could continue in or-
der to facilitate the possibility of enhancing IVF technology,'
12 2 it
should only be done on excess embryos,123 and not beyond fourteen
days after fertilization.1 2' This conclusion was based upon a moral
acknowledgment that an embryo in its individual capacity as a
human "entity" was entitled to a level of respect higher than that
given an organism created for purely experimental purposes.123
Interestingly, in the final analysis, a majority of the Commit-
tee refused to countenance the proposition that an unimplanted
embryo has any legally protectable rights. 26 The extent to which
parents may exert rights of control or ownership over stored em-
bryos remains equally unclear.1 27 Nonetheless, it was recognized
116. Id. § 3.29.
117. Id. § 1.9.
118. Id. § 2.13.
119. Id.
120. Id. §§ 2.11.1-.11.3.
121. Id. § 3.24.
122. Id. § 3.25.
123. Id. § 3.26. For dissenting views, see pp. 62-74.
124. Id. § 3.29.
125. Id. § 3.27.
126. Id. § 2.19.
127. Id. § 2.8.
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that the couple whose gametes are used to form the embryo in the con-
text of an IVF programme should be recognized as having rights which
are in some ways analogous to those recognized in parents of a child after
its birth. The Committee does not consider that those rights are abso-
lute, just as the rights of parents are limited by the rights and interests
of the child, and by the larger concerns of the community in which they
live.128
An impassioned dissent was registered by Rev. Francis
Harman in response to the Committee's conclusion on the contin-
ued use of frozen embryos for research in the Victoria IVF pro-
gram. 12 9 Rejecting the argument that the embryo is but an "inde-
terminate mass of cells with the potential to become human" after
some degree of fetal development, 130 Rev. Harman asserted philo-
sophically and scientifically that a high probability existed that an
"incipient personhood" justified protecting the embryo from re-
search and experimentation efforts."31
It is quite evident from its reported deliberations and actual
recommendations that the Waller Committee tried very carefully
to balance the best interests of the children conceived by IVF with
the rights and duties of the community and of those persons in-
volved with the process (donors, medical and scientific personnel)
in making its ultimate finding.3 2 In this regard, the Committee is
to be applauded for its notable success. Some of the Committee
recommendations will be incorporated in the Victoria govern-
ment's in vitro legislative proposals for subsequent Parliamentary
considerations, while others will be open to further debate and
study.13 s
While the standing committee of Attorneys-General of Austra-
lia has agreed on the desirability to work toward the development
of a uniform code of legislation to cover in vitro fertilization and
the legal status of children born through the use of donor semen or
ova,13 4 it is doubtful whether a working consensus can ever be
128. Id. § 2.8.
129. Id. Appendix A.
130 Id. § A2.1.
131. Id. § A2.3.4.
132. Id. § 1.1.
133. See Victoria Will Bar Payments to Surrogate Mothers, Sydney Morning Herald,
Sept. 4, 1984, at 3, col. 2.
134. Lawson, Molloy, Jobson & Walley, The Life and Strange Times of Elsa Rios,
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reached among the six state governments allowing for a uniform
code of regulation. Terms such as when life begins must be agreed
upon before effective regulations can be promulgated.
A serious blow to the efforts for responsive unification or pro-
gressive development of this area was dealt by Senator Harradine
who in the National Parliament on April 23, 1985, introduced "A
Bill for An Act to Prohibit Experiments Involving the Use of
Human Embryos Created by In Vitro Fertilization," before the
embryo has been implanted in the womb of a woman."'5 In August,
1985, while emphasizing the need for a national resolution of the
problems of the new reproductive technology, the Family Law
Council joined with Senator Harradine by reporting to the federal
government that experiments on human embryos and acts of sur-
rogation should be prohibited.'36 In order to meet the plethora of
vexatious problems confronting federal, state, and local govern-
ments in the field of artificial conception, the Family Law Council
urged the establishment of a national council to monitor and ad-
vise the respective governments. 3
7
To be more specific, on July 24, 1985, The Family Law Coun-
cil of Australia issued its report, Creating Children: A Uniform
Approach to the Law and Practice of Reproductive Technology in
Australia and sought thereby to present a unified approach to
tackling the major issues of the new reproductive technology.
13 s
Recognizing that broad, fundamental questions of both public pol-
icy and public interest are inextricably related to the basic medical
procedures of this new technology, the Council called for a mea-
sured "outreach" to other disciplines, especially to the community-
at-large, in approaching resolutions."' Toward the achievement of
this goal at a national level, the Council called for the establish-
The [Australian] Bulletin 25 (July 3, 1984).
135. A Bill for An Act to Prohibit Experiments Involving the Use of Human Embryos
Created by In Vitro Fertilisation, in the Senate of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, April 23, 1985.
136. Glasgow, Law Council Urges Ban on Laboratory Embryos, The Australian, Aug.
22, 1985, at 3. col. 1.
137. Id. The Deputy Chairman of the Law Reform Commission of New South Wales,
Russell Scott, prefers a monitoring approach over a prohibitory one in dealing with the new
reproductive biology.
138. FAMILY LAW COUNCIL, CREATING CHILDREN: A UNIFORM APPROACH TO THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY IN AUSTRALIA (1985).
139. Id. at vii.
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ment of a National Council on Reproductive Technology. The Na-
tional Council would, in turn, investigate the"social moral, legal
and ethical questions and values which cannot be easily or lightly
debated-and which are not all capable of absolute and final an-
swers. Many of these questions will need to be subject to ongoing
review and community debate because of their fundamental
nature."'140
Rather than await further study and investigation of a number
of issues by the proposed National Council, the Family Law Coun-
cil recommended initially, among other matters, that public policy
dictates surrogacy arrangements be viewed as "contrary to the wel-
fare and interests of the child."' It recommended, furthermore,
all exchanges of money for surrogate mother services (e.g., the ad-
vertisements and subsequent contracts) be prohibited by law.
42
Yet, as to the issue of the use of donor gametes (donor sperm, do-
nor ova and donor embryos where both ova and sperm are
donated) the Family Council observed that, insofar as the use of
donor sperm obtained from artificial insemination had been used
for fifteen years in Australia to assist infertile couples in "conceiv-
ing" a child, 48 this practice should be allowed to continue.
144
However, more adequate standards and guidelines on a uni-
form basis of operation were recommended. 45 While the use of
"known donors of gametes who are related to the recipient couple"
should not be permitted, 46 the use of such gametes whose donors
are not related to the IVF candidate couples should be allowed.
This assumes that full information and access to special counseling
be provided prior to finalizing such arrangements.1 7 Concerning
the production of human embryos, the Family Council recom-
mended such human embryos not be produced solely for the pur-
poses of research or experimentation. 48 A majority of the Council
recommended prohibiting the use of "spare" or excess human em-
140. Id. at 101.
141. Id. at xiii.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 71.
144. Id. at xiii.
145. Id.
146. Id. at xiv.
147. Id.
148. Id. at xiv.
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bryos for research experimentative purposes.14 9
These are "recommendations." Yet, they are studied proposals
made by a group of distinguished men and women sensitive to the
growing significance of the challenges and the opportunities of the
new reproductive technology. Surely, if and when a National Coun-
cil on Reproductive Technology is established in Australia, the
work of the Family Law Council and especially the Waller Com-
mittee will be of immense value in resolving the on-going debate
and, where possible, providing legislative direction instead of judi-
cial interpretations in this intensely complex area.
B. The Orphan Embryos of Melbourne
A striking paradigm of the medical, social, moral, legal, ethi-
cal, and public policy issues of the new reproductive technology
was presented dramatically and, indeed, eclipsed the investigative
work of the Waller Committee and the Family Law Council as well
as the Warnock Committee. On May 20, 1981, a married couple
from Los Angeles, California, Mario and Elsa Rios, were allowed to
participate in the in vitro fertilization program in Melbourne, Aus-
tralia that operated from the Queen Victoria Medical Center.1 5
These initial actions subsequently set in motion a crisis of concern
not only in Australia but around the world and showed, with vivid
clarity, the complex realities of an ever-present brave new world.
Because of his infertility, Mr. Rios consented to the participa-
tion of an anonymous donor from Melbourne and, thereupon, arti-
ficial insemination was successfully achieved for three eggs pro-
vided by his wife. One embryo was implanted in Mrs. Rios on June
8, 1981, and the other two were frozen for subsequent use. Owing
to trauma associated with a miscarriage of the implanted embryo,
another attempt at impregnation was delayed until Mrs. Rios was
physically and mentally willing to proceed. But, before this oc-
curred, she and her husband died intestate in a plane crash in
Chile. '5 However, under California laws of intestate succession,
Mrs. Rios' son by a previous marriage was allowed a right to his
father's share of the estate and the mother of Mrs. Rios was enti-
149. Id.
150. Lawson, Molloy, Jobson & Walley, supra note 110, at 22.
151. Id. at 23.
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tied to take her daughter's share.152
In August, 1984, Professor Waller, Chairman of the Victoria
Law Reform Commission, determined the embryos had no inde-
pendent legal "rights" to be unfrozen and implanted in a surrogate
mother. He recommended they should be thawed and discarded.
15 3
The state legislature of Victoria instead ordered the remaining
Rios' embryos be preserved in their liquid nitrogen container.'54 As
of August 29, 1985, the embryos remained "on ice" awaiting the
appearance of a volunteer surrogate mother or yet another rendez-
vous with mortality.1
55
C. The Warnock Committee
In 1982, four years after the birth of the world's first test-tube
baby, the British government structured a Committee of Inquiry
into Human Fertilization and Embryology and mandated its mem-
bers, chaired by Dame Mary Warnock to examine the social, ethi-
cal, and legal implications of the new reproductive biology.15 The
Committee submitted its Report in July, 1984, and great debate
and discussion has followed, 5 ' both in the press5 s and in Parlia-
ment.5 " The Report prompted Mr. Enoch Powell to introduce in
152. CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 6401, 6402 (West Supp. 1986). See also, Wallis, Quick-
ening Debate Over Life on Ice, TIME MAG. July 2, 1984, at 46.
153. Supra note 111, §§ 2.14-2.19. See also, Lawson, Molloy, Jobson & Walley, supra
note 110.
154. The Times [London], Oct. 25, 1984, at 7, col. 2. The National Perinatal Statistics
Unit of the Fertility Society of Australia in Sydney, issued in 1985 a report entitled, In
Vitro Fertilization Pregnancies: Australia and New Zealand 1979-1984. Reporting on nine
hundred and nine pregnancies resulting from in vitro fertilization procedures in eleven IVF
units in Australia and one in New Zealand, the report showed 54.6% of these pregnancies,
or four hundred ninety-six in actual numbers, resulted in live births. One hundred seventy-
four or 19.1% of the total pregnancies resulted in preclinical abortions, forty-five or 5.0%
ectopic pregnancies, one hundred seventy-two or 18.9% resulted in spontaneous abortions
and twenty-two or 2.4% of the pregnancies were still birthed. Id. at 2.
155. See Letter from Professor Louis Waller, Chairperson of The Law Reform Com-
mission of Victoria, to Professor Smith dated August 29, 1985, a copy of which is on file in
the offices of the Gonzaga Law Review.
156. Priest, The Report of the Warnock Committee on Human Fertilization and Em-
bryology, 48 MoD. L. REV. 73 (1985). See also Glazebrook, Human Beginnings, 43 CAMB. L.J.
209 (1984).
157. Id.
158. See Facing The Brave New World, TIME MAG., Aug. 5, 1984, at 50; A Welcome
Report, 289 BRIT. MED. J.. 207 (1984).
159. Brahams, The Legal and Social Problems of In Vitro Fertilization: Why Parlia-
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the House of Commons a Private Member's Bill entitled, "The Un-
born Children (Protection) Bill." The bill was designed not only to
prevent experiments on human embryos but to classify such acts of
experimentation as criminal. 1 0 This bill would, however, provide
for the fertilization of a specific human embryo in vitro only when
attempting to impregnate a specific woman who first received per-
mission for the procedure from the Social Services Secretary.16
Essentially, the Warnock Committee approved the cry-
opreservation of embryos-but only under strict constraints and
subject to review by a statutory licensing authority.1 62 The Com-
mittee recognized that even though embryos enjoyed an ethical or
moral (e.g., "special") status, research could continue on them,
subject to careful monitoring for a fourteen day period. 163 Further,
"spare" embryos are the proper subject for research within this
time period if informed consent to such actions is otained from the
couple generating the embryo.1 4 The Committee advised that leg-
islation be enacted to allow research on any embryonic life derived
from in vitro fertilization, regardless of whether it was intention-
ally or unintentionally developed for that purpose. Ten years
would be the maximum allowable time for storage with the right of
disposal passing to the storage authority after that time. 6 5 As to
rights of inheritance, the Committee proposed legislation to elimi-
nate the dilemma of Australia's "orphan" embryos by providing
that any child born of an IVF process (that used either a frozen or
stored embryo) "who was not in utero at the death of the father
shall be disregarded for the purposes of succession to the inheri-
tance from the latter."'66 On the issue of surrogation, or surrogate
mothers, the Committee proposed legislation be drawn that would
impose a criminal sanction for the maintenance of surrogate
ment Must Legislate, 51 MED. LEGAL J. 236 (1983).
160. Bevins, Challenge as MPs Pass Powell Bill, The [London] Times, Feb. 15, 1985
at 4, col. 1. See Warnock, Absolutely Wrong, THE TIMES [London], May 30, 1985, at 12, col.
3.
161. Stevens, British Battle Looming Over In Vitro Program, The [Melbourne] Age,
June 19, 1985, at 13, col. 1.
162. Priest, supra note 156, passim. See also, The Warnock Committee, 289 BRT.
MED. J. 238, passim (1984).
163. Priest, supra note 156, at 77.
164. See 289 BRIT. MED. J. 238 passim (1984).
165. Id.
166. Id. Proposal 63.
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mother agencies. At the same time, the Committee suggested those
individuals entering into private surrogation arrangements in con-
nection with IVF procedures be exempted from criminal
prosecution. 
16 7
In 1984, the American Fertility Society authorized a statement
on in vitro fertilization. Among other things, the statement pointed
out that ethically acceptable research procedures could be set and
followed for donated embryos up to fourteen days after fertiliza-
tion.16 Although it recognizes that embryos are the property of the
donors, it nonetheless provides for authorization of cryopreserva-
tion for the length of the mother's reproductive life.16 9 As long as
anonymity is retained and donors waive their parental rights, the
donation of embryos to another infertile married couple is
recognized. 171
The Waller and the Warnock Committees' outstanding work
in developing a blueprint for progress in the field of artificial con-
ception is an enormous contribution of unparalleled magnitude.
The implementing measures of the work is proceeding in their re-
spective legislative forums. Even in those cases where the commit-
tees' recommendations are encountering opposition, a constructive
and open dialogue has been opened and is of considerable impor-
tance in resolving efforts to find a framework for principled deci-
sion-making. It remains for the United States to assume its right-
ful position in the vanguard of the "New Reproductive Biology"
and not only begin, anew, to conduct vital scientific research into
the processes of in vitro fertilization and the other variants of arti-
ficial conception,7 1 but to structure a national and on-going inves-
tigative dialogue to direct, and, where necessary, implement and
guide the scientific imperative for research and development. To-
ward the achievement of this end, a National Commission for
Bioethics is needed desperately.
167. Id.
168. American Fertility Society: Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FER-




171. See Delgado & Miller, God, Galileo and Government: Toward Constitutional
Protection for Scientific Inquiry in 1 ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE
NEW WORLD 231 (G. Smith ed. 1982).
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VII. A FRAMEWORK FOR PRINCIPLED DECISIONMAKING
Collaborative or artificial reproduction would allow a child to
have upward of five parents: "an egg donor, a sperm donor, a sur-
rogate mother who gestates the fetus and the couple who raise the
child. ' 172 Regrettably, neither the legitimative status of the child
nor legal protection afforded the various collaborative partners is
clearly affirmed.
1 73
One pre-eminent legal authority has suggested that if the in-
terest of the children is regarded as paramount, the American
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws should, in their drafting
pursuits, "focus on status issues,' 1 74 to the extent practicable,
build on existing laws and "stay away from regulating questions'
17 5
(e.g., licensing of surrogate mothers). As to sperm and ovum do-
nors, it is suggested self-regulation of the medical profession is pre-
ferred to any type of licensure.17 And this method would be rein-
forced by the physicians' "healthy respect for-or fear of-tort and
malpractice laws, to ensure their adherence to good practice.' 77
These are commendable suggestions, but incomplete. Also
needed is strong public participation headed by informed organiza-
tions seeking to both develop and promulgate guidelines to pro-
mote sound clinical practice, as the American Fertility Society re-
cently noted in issuing its new ethical guidelines.178 Further, a
National Commission for Bioethics of experts in law, science,
medicine and ethics should be created. This Commission would re-
port on an on-going basis to Congress and the individual states on
the practicability of developing specific regulatory schemes and,
where necessary, legislative programs.179 In the final analysis, the
172. Andrews, The Stock Market: The Law of the New Reproductive Technologies 70
A.B.A.J. 50, 56 (Aug. 1984).
173. Id.
174. Krause, Artificial Conception: Legal Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q. 185, 193 (1985).
175. Id.
176. Id., at 198.
177. Id.
178. Otten, supra note 16. At present, the Society must simply wait to see if hospitals
will even adopt its recommended policies.
179. Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New
Laws, HASTINGS CENTER RPT. 50, 52 (Oct. 1984); Frank, Moral Morass: Fetuses' Legal Sta-
tus Touchy, 71 A.B.A.J. 32, 33 (Nov. 1985).
The Report on Human In Vitro Fertilization of the Ethics Advisory Board of the
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1979 suggested the need for
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stability requires development of a legislative strategy that admits
both an attack on and resolution of issues of legitimacy and inheri-
tance and also provides a framework for daily or contemporary de-
cision-making.
The laxity and, indeed, total lack of professionalism the medi-
cal profession has exhibited "regulating" itself with artificial in-
semination procedures 8 " militates against the feasibility of total
continued "self-discipline" in the area of in vitro fertilization, sur-
rogation and the related areas of artificial conception.181 If a bal-
ance could be struck between legislative strategies and professional
control, significant long-term progress could be both charted and
assured. Licensure or supervision of in vitro fertilization centers
and of surrogate mothers by the state would, to some degree, be
necessary in order to assure the highest standards of health and
prevent commercial exploitation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As long as the family is the focal point of society, we must
explore legal and medical initiatives and safeguards in order to as-
sure the success of the family unit and design ways to neutralize, if
not stabilize, the unexpected. The Rios case is but a precursor of
major problems to arise in the future as the challenges, hopes and
frustrations of the brave new world visit themselves in full force
a uniform or model law that would clarify the legal status of an IVF child. Supra note 89, at
35.058.
See also an address, "IVF-The Scope and Limitation of Law," given by Mr. Justice
Michael D. Kirby, President of the Court of Appeal, The Supreme Court, New South Wales,
Australia, delivered at the Conference on Bioethics and the Law of Human Conception-In
Vitro Fertilization at the Grosvenor House, London, England, September 29-30, 1983. There
Mr. Justice Kirby advocated that law making here "should be developed in the democratic
institution of law making: the representative parliament, aided and encouraged by the inter-
disciplinary bodies which take pains in consulting a wide range [of] experts but the general
community as well." Id. at 11.
180. See Currie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemina-
tion by Donor in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585 (Mar. 15, 1979).
See also P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 202 passim (1977).
181. The Recommendations of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gist Concerning Surrogate Mothering issued on May 10, 1983, are an example of professional
standards of the kind that could be used as a model for legislative adoption or as a structure
for developing an administrative scheme of operation.
See Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate
Mothers, 5 WEST NEW ENG. L. REv. 639, 665-66 (1983).
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upon contemporary society. The legislative response to this partic-
ular case was both proper and reasonable. If change must occur,
and indeed it must, it should be charted in the legislative assem-
blies. There, the conscience and the understanding of each region
may be codified in response to various developments of "The New
Biology" as they are tested and become the new "facts of life."
Infertility, as an impediment to family growth, must be studied
further and, when feasible, arrested. Only through continued and
cautious research into the process of in vitro fertilization will the
family be assured of its rightful privacy in society and will the
tragic circumstances of infertility be met and resolved.
Thus, if we approach continued experimentation and use of
human in vitro fertilization with careful resolve to use it not solely
as an end to the deeply felt tragedy of barren marriages and
thereby minimize human suffering and maximize the social good of
maintaining the essence of societal growth-children-we will ap-
proach the future with a steadfast knowing assurance that, as did
Daedalus, we will arrive safely and meet these two fundamental
goals of our very societal existence. If we are driven by a spirit of
recklessness and with no direction, we will surely be corrupted and,
as Icarus, fall. 182 "If mankind is not for itself, who then will be?
And if not now, when?"18 Surely love must seek to balance knowl-
edge or all is lost.
1 84
182. Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO.
L.J. 697, 733 (1976).
183. Stone, Knowledge, Survival, and the Duties of Science 23 Am. U.L. REV. 231, 260
(1973). See generally, Smith, Intrusions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion and the New Biol-
ogy, 3 PACE U.L. REV. 63 (1982).
184. H. MULLER, OUT OF THE NIGHT 158 (1935). See Marcin, Justice and Love, 33
CATH. UL. REV. 363 (1984).
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